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ABSTRACT
The goals of trade adjustment assistance (TAA)are to ease transition,
compensate injury, and bleed political pressure for protectionism.Section
I of the paper outlines the economicprinciples underlying these goals, arid
their shifting historical importance in the U.S.Sections II and III of
the paper discuss the personal characteristics ofa representative sample
of worker recipients of TAA in 1976, and their labormarket success in
several subsequent years. Their experience iscompared to that of a matched
sample of workers receiving standard unemployment insurance (UI).Coinpari—
Sons in Section II focus on differences in mean characteristics andexperience between the TAA and UI samples, controllingonly for whether workers returned
eventually to the firm from which they were initially separated.Comparisons in Section III focus on differences between theTAA and UI samples in their
ability to recover lost employment and income, usinga regression approach
that in principle controls for all relevantvariables, and not for just one.
The most important conclusions of the researchare the following.
(1) The majority of TAA recipients in 1976were not permanently displaced,
but returned eventually to their formeremployers. A far greater proportion
of UI recipients suffered permanent displacement. (2) Workersreceiving TAA
had higher incomes on average than theircounterparts who received only UI.
Their incomes furthermore fell less frequently below thepoverty line. (3)
TAA recipients nevertheless experienced morefrequent and enduring transi-
tional unemployment than did UI recipients, and didnot return to their former
income level as rapidly.(4) The reasons for conclusion (3) were unclear. It
could not readily be explained by differences between theTAA arid UI samples
in permanence of layoff, generosity ofprogram benefits, age, experience,
Industry, affluence, economic environment, socioeconomicstatus, or behavioral
responses to any of these variables.
Conclusions (1) and (2) are at variance with mostprevious work on TAA.,
Conclusion (3) is not, but the traditional explanations for itare those that
conclusion (4) rules out.
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INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW 1
I.HISTORICAL ANDECONOMIC













Since1962 in the United States, workers and firms suffering
transitional injury due to international trade have been able to benefit
from a U.S. program of "adjustment assistance." The goals of trade
adjustment assistance (TAA) have been to ease transition, compensate
injury, and bleed political pressure for protectionism.
Section I of the paper outlines the economic principles underlying
thesegoals, and their shifting historical importance. SectionsII and
III of the paperdiscuss the personal characteristicsof a representative
sample of worker recipients of TAAin1976, and their labormarketsuccess
in several subsequent years. Theirexperienceis compared to thatofa
matched sample of workersreceiving standard unnp1oyment insurance (UI).
Comparisons inSection II focus on differences in meancharacteristicsand
experience between the TAA and UI samples, controlling onlyfor whether
workers returned eventually to the firmfromwhich they were initially
separated. Comparisons in Section III focus on differencesbetween the
TAA and UI samplesintheir ability to recover lost nployment and income,
usingaregression approach thatinprinciple controls for all relevant
variables, and not for just one.
The most important conclusions of the research are the following.
(1) The majority of TAA recipients in 1976 were not permanently displaced,
but returned eventually to their former employers. By contrast, a f at
greater proportion of UI recipients suffered permanentdisplacement.
(.2)Workers receiving TAA badhigher incomes on. average thantheircounter-
parts who received only UI. Theirincomes furthermore fell less frequently—2—
below the poverty line.(3) TAArecipientsnevertheless experienced more
frequent and enduring transitional unemployment than did UI recipients,
and did not return to their forrner income level as rapidly. (4) The
reasons for conclusion (3) were unclear. In particular, itcould not
readily be explained by diffetances between the TAAandUI samples in
permanence of layoff, generosity of program benefits, age, experience,
industry,affluence, economic enviromnent, socioeconomic status, or
behavioral responses to any of these variables.
Conclusions (1) and (2) are at variance with most previous work on
TAA. Conclusion (3) is not, but the traditional explanations for it are
those thatconclusion(4) rules out.—3—
I. HISTORICAL AND ECONOMIC UNDPINNINGSOF
U.S. TRADE ADJUSTMENT ASSISTANCE1
1Thissection is an expansion of parts of my contribution to Corson
et al. (1979).
Economic Underpinnings
U.S. trade adjustment assistance (TAA) can be historically explained
as alleviating three problems that relate to international trade liberalization.
The first is a problem of distributional equity, reflected in protectionist
political pressure, and the second, of al].ocative efficiency, reflected in
much economic commentary. Political economy plays an important role in its
most recent justification ——itis now frequently defended as a bribe
necessary to avoid disastrous de—liberalizing trade wars.
(1) Distributional Equity. Except in ideal worlds, there are always
gainers and losers from trade liberalization. To design and carry out prac-
tical mechanisms whereby every loser was fully compensated (and more) would
require a mammoth diversion of any nation's resources from wealth—producing
to wealth-transferring activity. Yet in the absence of much mechanisms,
there may be instances in which trade liberalization is rejected or reversed
because it undermines a society's sense of equity, or because its rejection
creates an implicit contractual claim to comparable protection (insurance)
in similar circumstances by those who sacrifice their gains from trade
liberalization voluntarily (in order to inherit suchinsurance).2 Once one
2Baldwin (1980) is a recent expansion and illustration of these points.
Cordes and Weisbrod (1979) identify rejection or reversaleach as a
form of implicit compensation, while classifying and evaluatingother means
of indirect compensation.-4--
grants either such altruism or such implicit social contracting,there
exists the possibility of a social consensus that the moderately in-
creased satisfaction of the many from trade liberalization could be judged
insignificant compared to the dramatic uuhappiness imposed onthe few.3
public opinion survey summarized in Laudicina (1973, pp.51—57)
reveals that the most persuasive reason for opposing free trade was that
"free trade would put some American laborers Out of work because their jobs
can be done by foreign labor at much lower cost." 34 percentof the sample
said. they would "basically oppose" free trade. But only 15 percent would
continue to "basically oppose" it "if American workers who losttheir jobs
because of free trade did not suffer any personal financial lossand were
retrained in jobs equal to or better than their old ones." The surveyis
also summarized in Frank (1973, Appendix B).
Partial compensation is of course one compromise positionbetweenno
compehsation and maintenance of the status quo. It seemsreasonable to
insist that government policies like trade liberalization,undertaken in
the name of the whole society, should not burden any one partof it
excessively.
(2) Allocative Efficiency. Furthermore, the kind of lossesthat trade
liberalization can cause are in part social losses. In theface of contrac-
tually—determined, downwardly rigid rates ofincrease4 in wages, rents,
41n an inflationary environment, not only factor prices themselves, but
their rates of increase over time may be temporarily rigid.Rigid rates
of increase that are embodied in existing contracts presumablyhover on
average near the sum of expected ratesof inflation and productivity growth.
borrowing costs, and dividends, trade liberalizationthat discourages do-
mestic demand for import substitutes may cause temporarylayoffs and idling
of productive land and equipment. Dislocated laborand resources are made—5—
involuntarily unproductive until they can bere—absorbed.5 And even then,
5Characterizing dislocation as "involuntaryt' is controversial, as are
therefore the "social" costs that rest on that characterization. The eco-
nomics of optimal contracts suggests that. labor and other factor suppliers
may be influenced by uncertainty and subjective attitudes toward risk to
choose (optimally from their viewpoint) rigid—price or rigid—rate—of—change
contracts and (optimally again) to accept the consequent quantity adjustments
to their employment and utilization rates. For similar reasons, producers
may choose to contract for product price rigidity, and may findthe offer of
fixed—schedule contracts for factor prices more supportive of their goals in
the face of uncertainty than flexible—price contracts. When rigid factor
and product prices are optimally chosen in this fashioit, it is not clear that
there is any social cost to the resulting periodic unemployment and excess
capacity. In this case then, the principal defense of TAA must be on grounds
of distributional equity.
their productivity may remain temporarily below par if labor must be re-
trained, and if resources must be retooled, refurbished, and relocated ——
oftenby labor and resources that are themselves diverted from other pro-
ductive activity. The national efficiency cost of this adjustment process
is measured by the value of goods which could have been produced, but were
not, because of temporary unemployment, underutilization, anddiversion of
resources.6 (And there may also be very real subjective and psychic costs
6Ef forts to calculate these costs empirically have been madebyMagee
(1972), Cline et al. (1978), and Baldwin et al. (1980).
to those unemployed that affect their future productivity unfavorably and
permanently).
Both of these concerns can be seen underlying the U.S. political!
economic/philosophical concept of "injury" that was prominently stressed
in the Trade Agreements program of1934. The belief is that trade
7Metzger (1971, Pp. 319—326) is a useful brief history of the concept
and its reference to TM.(
—6--
liberalization should be abandoned if it involves undue economic injury
to U.S.firmsor labor groups.. That rule was formalized in the late 1940s
by the "escape—clause" provisions f U.S. trade legislation, andalso by
Article XIX of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), Govern—
merits could "escape" from trade concessions that caused undue injury by
restoring, their previous trade barriers or acceptable substitutes.The
domestic income distribution would presumably return toward the desired
status quo. And wasteful unemployment of labor and resources would be
discouraged.
Invoking the escape clause, however, appeared to many commentators to
be a costly way to avoid undesirable dislocation, it essentially surrendered
all resource—reallocation and standard—of—living gains that had come from
the trade concession in the name of avoiding inequity and dislocation ——
therebythrowing out the baby with the bath water. Furthermore, under the
rules of the CATT, recourse to the escape clause allowed trading partners
to be compensated8 through retaliation ——whichcould sometimes impose
8Two "needs" for compensation invariably arise in trade policy: the
need for domestic losers to be compensated by domestic gainers, and the need
for foreign losers to be likewise compensated. In both cases, once the merit
of compensation is granted, the key problem is finding the most efficient
(or least inefficient) scheme for carrying it out. See Cordes and Weisbrod
(1979).
unexpectedly severe injury on the U.S. export.ables sector. Finally the U.S.
escape clause made other nations less willing toembark on significant multi-
lateral liberalization, since they could not be certain of just how permanent
U.S. concessions would be (Metzger (1971,p.324)).
In practice, the escape clause was simply infeasible as atool for
avoiding inequity and dislocation while pursuing expandednational pur——7—
chasing power through trade. Between 1947 and 1962, the U.S. Tariff
Conznission found injury in 33 escape—clause cases brought before it, and
split evenly in 8 more. Of the 41, the President invoked the escape clause
in 15, and refused to do so in 26, presumably with an eye to foreign re-
action and retaliation. In the 15, at least some beneficial trade liberali-
zation was abandoned. In the 26, at least some undesirable injury was left
unrequited.
To several comniissions and commentators in the 1950's, this Hobson's
choice was neither intrinsic nor inevitable.9 Most explored and recommended
9Frank and Levinson (1978, pp. 2—3) cite a number of examples, including:
an influential article by Clair Wilcox (1950); the "Bell Report" (U.S. Public
Advisory Board for Mutual Security (1953)); and the well—publicized 1954 ideas
of David McDonald, president of the United Steelworkers of America in the
"Randall Report" (U.S. Commission on Foreign Economic Policy (1954)). For
eight years following McDonald's proposal Congressional bills were introduced
that codified the idea of trade adjustment assistance. But no hearings were
ever held, even during consideration of the 1955 and 1958 extensions of the
Trade Agreements Act (Metzger (1971, p. 323)).
alternative ideas that later became embodied in trade adjustment assistance:
(1) directly targetted financial support to compensate both dislocated labor
and firms; and (2) encouragement to both labor and firms to re—orient quickly
their skills, resources, and enterprise toward expanding buoyant industries
(such as exportables) where their productivity would be enhanced in the long
run. It was hoped that the former aspect would ease distributional inequities
from trade liberalization, and thereby remove political obstacles to it. It
was hoped that the latter aspect would reduce the duration of inefficient,
involuntary unproductivity for resources moving among sectors, and thereby
reduce the economic cost. of trade liberalization. Neither aspect, of course,-8-
would force the U.S. to forego beneficial trade concessions.And neither
would provoke foreign anger, retaliation, or reluctance to bargain.Adniin—
istrative resource costs of each kind of compensationwould probably have
seemedcomparable——somegovernment agency would have to investigateand
recommend in each case, and the executive branch would have o approveor
deny the recoitiniendation. For all dimensions taken together,therefore, trade
adjustment assistance seemed in principle todominate escape—clause relief.
(3) Bribes. In recent years, the issue underlyingtrade adjustment
assistance has changed from T0 much tradeliberalization?" to "how much
protection?". As a result, TAA is frequentlydefended from a new point of
view that springs from political economy. It is arguedthat if TAA were
not available, the political forces for increased protectionwould dominate,
imposing large social costs through inefficienciesthat would increase
exponentially as trade barriers rise. TM stillassists and adjusts ex post.
But now it also bribes ex ante those coalitionsof losers from trade that
would destroy a socially beneficial status quo inthe absence of TM. In
its new role, then, TAA has additional distributiveand allocative effects:
compensating groups with credible threats todo social harm, and avoiding
the allocative inefficiencies that are the instrumentsof that potential harm.
The Program Under the Trade Expansion Act of1962
The Kennedy Administration was prodded byattitudes both at home and
abroad to propose trade adjustment assistanceformally in 1962. Kennedy
very much wanted significant
multilateral tarife cuts to assure U.S. access
to the burgeoning European Common Market.To gain the same commitment from
European nations, he proposed significant
tightening of the criteria for—9—
escape—clause relief, so as to reassure them of the permanency of U.S.
concessions. To reassure Congress about this tightening, and to gain
cozgressional authority for substantial tariff cuts, he proposed TMas
the preferable way of relieving any U.S. injury. A cautious Congress in-
corporated a carefully circumscribed program1° into the Trade Expansion Act of 1962.
10Congressional caution was due largely to the unprecedented nature of
the program. The early 1960's also marks the beginning of a similar program
to assist Americans dislocated by military base closings, and to help them
adjust. These years also saw passage of labor "adjustment" legislation such
as theManpowerDevelopment and Training Act (1962) and the Economic
Opportunity Act (1964). On these parallel programs to TM, see 1'rank and
Levinson (1978, Chapters 6 and 7). Trade adjustment assist3nce was also a
temporary feature of the Canadian—American Auto Agreement, and is summarized
briefly by Fooks (1971, p. 352) and Jonish (1970).
The most important distributional assistance provisions of this early TAA
program were:
——forlabor: supplements to unemployment insurance (UI)
payments to replace 65 percent of normal income for up to one
year,11 and up to a year and a half for workers who were over
11One mightargue that normal unemployment insurance would have been
sufficient. But that would give no weight to the social—choice motivation
for compensating this injury. Workers dislocated because of trade liberali-
zation are paying a personal price for a policy deemed socially profitable.
On the other hand, workers dislocated because of similar socially profitable
policies such as deregulation, environmental control, and occupational safety
and health standards receive no compensation beyond UI.
60 or being retrained, as long as such payments did not exceed
the maximum income—support level of 65 percent of the average
weekly manufacturing wage;—10—
——forfirms: special ta privileges that enabled
them to increase after—tax profits.
The most important provisions that were designed to reduce inefficiency by
speeding adjustment included:
——forlabor affected (or threatened) by trade liberali-
zation:(1) special encouragement to take part in existing
training, counseling, and job—placement programs (but no
special programs); and (2) relocation allowances covering
family moving expenses to a new job elsewhere:
——forfirms affected (or threatened) by trade
liberalization: low—interest loans or loan guarantees
for modernization or retoo1in of plant and equipment and
for acquisition of working capital; free tectiriical con-
sultation on adapting to change, and on sales outlooks and
forecasts.
In practice, trade adjustment assistance under this legislation was
initially non—existent. The support of organized labor for the US. program
quickly dried up as seven years went by with significant import growth but
without a single approval of •adjustmentassistance case. (Six cases
were turned down.) Adjustment assistance, in the eyes of most labor
spokespersons, was a cruel hoax.
Whatcreatedthis dormancy was a combination of stringent criteria for
eligibility, and strict interpretation of the criteria by theTariff Coinmis—
sion officials responsible for ruling on each case. To be approvedfor
adjustment assistance benefits, petitioners had to prove not onlythat they—11—
hadbeen injured by U.S.tradeliberalization, but thatithadbeen the
majorcause of their injury. "Major" was initially interpreted to mean
"single most important." That conservative interpretation made approval
almostimpossible ——laborand management are continually buffeted by a
myriad of other important shocks in addition to trade liberalization,
Furthermore, the process of applying for adjustment assistance was a
bureaucratic nightmare. It not only diverted the services of company and
union officials, but also required lawyers in preparation of "the case,"
and finally involved considerable time. Each case hadtobe determined
within roughly eight months, but coupled with other lags and delays, it
could sometimes take more. than two years tQrece.yethe Urst adjustment
12
assistance payments —evenwhenthe case was approved, There is no
12Bale(1973) reports an average delay of 13 months between separation
and receipt of the first adjustment assistance check. McCarthy (1975a,
p. 8) reports an average delay of 19.4 months for a sample of dislocated
New England shoeworkers. Other studies of worker and firm experience
under the initialU.S. TAAprograminclude McCarthy (1975b, l975c), Neumann
(1978), and Neumann et al. (1976). Studies of worker experience under the
most recent TAAprograminclude Corson et al. (1979) and Jacobson
(1979). Studies of worker and firm experience under both programs
include numerous General Accounting Office reports, Frank and Levinson
(1978),and Bale (1979).
doubtthat many firms and labor groups simply were unwilling to apply. Even
approval would have been unprofitable. For them, adjustment assistance might
just as well not have been available.
The Nixon Administration brought a shift toward less strict inter-
pretations in the early 1970's, and revived U.S. adjustment assistance.
Both applications and approvals accelerated. Legislative revision of the
adjustment—assistance program under the U.S. Trade Act of 1974 made an even
more dramatic impact, as revealed in Table 1. Most dramatic of all is the—12--
increase in petitions and projected outlays brought on by the auto—centered
recession of 1979—80. These are not reflected in the table but have been
estimated to require an extra $1 billion of outlays in fiscal 1980 and
$0.4 billion in fiscal l9l (Washington star, April 3, 1980). 859 petitions
fo.r TAA were filed during the first three months of 1980 alone (Rosep
(1980, p. 2))!
The Program Under the Trade Act of 1974
Under the Trade Act of 1974, the number of wbrkers certified eligible
for TAA benefits quickly rose to. more than 10 times its annual average under
even the liberal administration of the former prcgram. And budget outlays
mushroomed comparably.
Statutory changes that made adjustment assistance moreattractive
included: (1) raising labor's potential income support with TAA supplements
to 70 percent of normal income, as long as this did notexceed 100 percent
(raised from 65 percent) of the average weekly manufacturin.g wage; (2)
requiring that labor cases be determined in two, not eight, months, by the
Secretary of Labor, and not by the slow—moving, quasi—judicial International
TradeCommission (ne the Tariff Commission); (3)providing separate funds
outof tariff revenues for retraining trade—displaced workers;and (4)
allowing reimbursement for a portion of job—search expenses.
But by far the most important statutory changes related to eligibility.
First, adjustment assistance was made potentially available to firms and
labor injured by imports f or reason, whether because of government
trade concessions or not. And second, imports needed only to contribute














































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Whilethesecond change is laudable from the point of view of equity
(and perhaps efficiency), the first raises awkward questions regarding
a distributional defense of TAA ——thatpolicy for the national interest
not impose excessive burdens on any citizen. Why, for example, should
workers be compensated at higher than UI levels for market—determined injury
just because the markets are international? Is it economically defensible
that the U.S. compensate domestic producers who are in an extreme case lazy
or slow to adopt technological advances, thereby losing competitiveness to
foreigners? Compensation for such injury is possible under the new adjust-
ment—assistance program. The increasingly familiar answer is that "political
reality" dictates such compensation as a super—normal bribe to mollify
protectionists. But the potential conflict between this rationale and a
society's distributional goals is apparent. Such bribes may create
inequities rather than curing them. And they clearly distort market signals
and incentives.13
13Alan Deardorff has argued that one should not overemphasize the
severing of TM's link to trade concessions under the 1974 Act. TAA is
still linked to government trade policy to the extent that if it were not
there, then increasingly protectionist trade barriers would substitute for
it. One can view the U.S. government thus as using TAA in the familiar
historical way to facilitate "concessions" on potential trade barriers
(that is, to reject recourse to them).
A second answer might begin with the observation that most foreign
governments are committed to aiding industries that suffer structural dis-
location and adjustment problems from any source, including themarket)4
14Recentsummaries of foreign adjustment assistance programs, some
trade—related and some not, exist in Frank and Levinson (1978, Chapter 9),
Weisz (1978, Part III and Appendices B and C), and U.S. General Accounting
Office (1979). Baldwin and Bale (1980) contains a useful summary of Canadian
adjustment assistance programs, and on these, see also Jenkins et al.
(1978).—16—
In light of this, protectionist changesinU.S. adjustmeflt assistance
can perhaps be defended as defensive, equalizingretaliation to foreign
beggar_your_neighbor policies with adverse consequencefor theU.S.income
dis tribut ion.
A general impression of the 1974 program in practiceis that its
assistance (equity) provisions have been considerably moresuccessful than
its adjustment (efficiency) provisions. And successfor one is not
necessarily unrelated to failure for the other.Insufficient attention has
been drawn to the intrinsic incompatibility of"assistance" and "adjustment"
programs as presently structured: one of the surest ways to bringabout
adjustment would be to provide noassistance, and assistance that compensated
for every burden would leave no incentive to adjust.One of the surprising
conclusions of the worker survey reported on in subsequentsections was the
large number of TAA—supported workerswho returned not only to their former
industry, but to their former firm (roughly3 out of every 5), and even to
their former job.15 Generous TAA benefits niayeven
15This accords well sith McCarthy's (1975c, p. 63) finding that roughly
two out of three re—employed Massachusettsshoeworkers who received TM
benefits under the 1962 program remained inthe shoe industry. By contrast
Neumannetal. (1976, pp. 3—19, 22) found that only about one infive re-employed
TAA recipients remained in their former industry.
have brought about a perverse expansionof the number of workers needing to
be compensated —_ifit made emplOyers more willing to laythem of f.16 Once
16Employers do not pay any supplemental financial penaltyfor laying
off workers who will be supported by TM supplementsto UI. Yet they may
take advantage of the fact that comparatively generousTM benefits make
workers less resistant tolayoffs.On the possible implicationsof these
matters for temporary unemployment, seeFeldstein (1975, 1976, 1978)—17—
a worker is certified eligible for TAA benefits, that eligibilityis auto-
matically activated for all layoffs covered by the petition in the subsequent
twoyears.
Based on the survey of 1976 recipients that is described below, adjust-
ment aspects of the 1974 program ——training,counseling, job—search, and re-
location allowances ——wereneglected about as much under the 1974 program
as earlier. Less than 10 percent of TAA recipients took advantage of
available employment services, and published figures on cumulated experience
are even more discouraging (U.S. Department of Labor (1980)). Only1 Out of
every 30 TAA recipients from 1975 through 1979(November) entered training;
only 1 out of roughly 200 received a job—search allowance;and only 1 out
of roughly 350 received a relocationallowance.17
17Use of these adjustment services has increased markedly among recent
TAA recipients, however. See footnote 2 of Aho (1980).
Distributional goals and realizations are by contrast much more con-
sistent. Combined UI and TAA payments replaced 76 percentof after—tax
income on average for as long as the eligibility of workerssurveyed lasted.
Nevertheless, the survey reveals that workers who are permanentlydisplaced
by trade seem to suffer a large income sacrifice eventhree or four years
after displacement (10 percent lower incomes for tenthan in their former
job, compared to 20 percent higher incomes for comparableUI recipients;
5 percent lower for women, compared to 16 percent higher).And it seems
there still remained substantial unpredictabilityand unduly long delays in the
process of petition, certification,and delivery of benefits. Despite the—18—
attempt to streamline the process, the first TAApaymentwas still generally
received more than a year after the separation that justifiedit.18 Lump
18Fourteeti months on average from the survey, which applied to1976.
The average lag between separation and application was halfof the total.
Considerable improvement in this aspect of performance has taken placein
1979 and 1980, however. See Aho (1980, footnote. 2) and Rosen (1980, p4).
sum payments were still received by almost 4 outof 5 surveyed TAkrecipients,
and delays in payments during the first year after sEparatiOncaused wrkerst
income losses to be more than 50 percent higher than if TM paymentshad
been made "as earned."S
—19—
II. TAA EXPERIENCE UNDER THE TRADE ACT O 1974: MEANS AND
CROSS—TABULATIONS FROM A COMPARATIVE SURVEY OF WORKERS
Describing the beneficiaries of the program, including the stability,
level, and growth of their income, is more important for TAA than for many
other government programs because of its distributional and political jus-
tifications. Sensible assessments of the program must identify whether those
who are aided are in fact "deserving" by some measure of equity or political
muscle. And such assessments should attempt to measure the extent to which
program benefits offset injury.19 How the "deserving" are defined ——whether
19As described below, this aspect of any assessment is methodologically
difficult. In principle, TAA benefits are paid whenever trade—related injury
is documented, and are not paid when no injury is present. Thus in principle,
one can observe instances only of simultaneous injury and benefit or of the
absence of both. That is, one can detect only the net influence of injury
and benefits. Short of social experimentation in which some economic agents
experienced either the injury or the benefits, but not both, there seem to
be only very subtle, uncertain ways of quantitatively assessing the scope of
injury alone, the impact of benefits alone, or the "extent to which program
benefits offset injury." A careful attempt is Jacobson (1979).
as poor, old, ambitious, productive, politically powerful, or some combina-
tion will not concern us here.
We will characterize workers receiving TAA, and not firms. In this
section we do so by comparing them one—dimensionally and two—dimensionally
to a sample of peers, focussing on unconditional mean differences or else
controlling for one other variable via cross—tabulations. In the next section
we compare TAA recipients to their peers multi—dimensionally, controlling
when feasible for all variables that are alleged to cause different worker
experience via regression analysis.—20-
A Recent Survey
The most recent survey of worker recipients of TAA was commissioned by
the U.S. Department of Labor, and issummarizedin Corson et aL (]979)20
20Previous surveys are referenced in note 12 above.
Sample design and survey methods are described at length in Appendixes A and
B of that report.
Interviews were carried out from November 1978 through February 1979,
virtually all of them in person, under the supervision of Mathernatica Policy
Research, Inc. (Princeton, New Jersey). Interviewees had received first
TAA payments in 1976, and the survey sample was designed to represent the
population of 1976 TAA recipients. 84 percent of those interviewed were
separated from their employer in late 1974 or 1975; 16 percent were
separated in 1976. For comparison purposes, a smaller sample of UI recip-
ients (not receiving TAA) was selected from the same state unemployment offices
that administered benefits to TAA recipients.21 The interview form was pre—
21For reasons described in Corson et al. (1979, pp. 195—198), the UI
sample was not matched precisely to the TAA sample with respect to either
industry (see below) or time of separation. Only 65 percent of the UI sample
left their jobs in late 1974 or 1975. Several comparison groups other than
comparably located UI recipients were considered, yet seemed like inferior
choices for reasons described in Corson et al. (1979, pp. 191—96).
tested and modified accordingly. Interviewers were trained and continually
supervised. Interview data were cross—checked through subsequentcalls and
visits by supervisors. The response rate among TAA recipients was 70 percent,—21—
and among UI recipients 54 percent. A few known characteristics of non—
respondents (from state unemployment office records) were compared to char-
acteristics of respondents. These suggested little non—response bias, and
no particular reason for believing that biases which remained affected one
group unduly compared to the other. The ultimate survey sample consisted f
——963TAA recipients ——
—— 538UI recipients ——
TheTAA sample was stratified by industry, represented in the same pro-
portions that characterized the industry source of 1976 TM payments. Columns
(1) and (2) of Table 2 describe the inter—industry manufacturing distribution
of workers in the survey (only one worker interviewed was in a non—manufacturing
industry) and in the corresponding national population of TAA recipients.
Column (3) suggests that the distribution has some claim to generality, having
not changed significantly during the first five years of the new program. In
late 1979 and early 1980 however, the auto industry's share of TM certif 1—
cations mushroomed. Column (4) describes the matched UI sample in the survey.
Interviews were conducted in 7 states, 3 chosen for the high proportion
of TAA payments being made there (Ohio, Pennsylvania, and New York), and 4
chosen randomly (California, Indiana, Massachusetts, and Virginia) from a set
of 4 industry groupings, with the probability of selection being proportional
to the number of TM payments in each state. 65 percent of the national pop-
ulation of TAA recipients resided in those 7 states. Equal numbers of inter-
views were conducted at each of 10 locations within each state. The locations
were chosen from a random sample of TM petitions classified by industryand
weighted by the number of workers each petition covered. The locationsulti-
mately selected reflected a significant varietyof labor—market conditions.—22—
TABLE 2
PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION OF TAA
AND UI RECIPIENTS IN MANUFACTURING: BY ThTDUSTRY
TAA RECIPIENTS UI RECIPIENTS
(1) •(2) (3) (4)
1976 1976 1975_801 1976
Survey National National Survey
Sample Population 9pulation Sample
Footwear 7.7 8.4 10.3 0.4
Apparel and
Other 2 Nondurables 30.3 25.7 22.5 plus 22.8
Automobiles 23.7 28.7 22.6 12.7
Steel 20.6 18.1 18.9 19.2
Other 2
Durables 17.7 19.1 11.8 plus 44.9
1Fro the start of the program through the first three months of 1980 only.
213.3 percent of TAArecipientsare unaccounted for in the source cited
below.
Sources: Column (2) from Corson et al. (1979, p. 192); Columns (1) and (4)
from data tape underlying Corson et al. (1979); Column(3) from
Rosen (1980, p. 3).—23—
As this was the first comprehensive survey of worker experience under
the Trade Act of 1974, some differences from previous surveys are due to
the changes in the TMprogramfrom the Trade Expansion Actof1962.
Chiefamong them is the dramatic increase in recourse to TM, due
largely to the easing of the eligibility criteria. As a result there is
some reason to believe that this survey is more representative and more
reliable than priorones because ofthe larger pooi of TM recipients to
sampleand because of the reduction in any systematic bias (e.g., against
small petitioners) caused by excessive petition costs under the old prograxa.
On the other hand, there are subtle differences between this survey
andprevious ones that arise because of changes in eligibility requirements.
Becauseimports need now be only an important cause of injury and not the
major cause, it is almost. certain thatworkersin the current survey will
beless injured by trade on average than workers in previous surveys. On
the other hand, because TM can now legally be awarded because of trade—
related injury for reason, whether due to prior government trade con-
cessions or not, the current survey is probably more representative than
earlier ones of workers displaced by imports as a whole, rather than just
thatportionof imports on which the government negotiated liberalization.
CharacterizingTM Recipients
The most important information in evaluating the TM program concerns
the characteristics and experience of workers receiving TM. Some of these
characteristics and experiences in our sample confirmed widespread impressions;
many did not. Some are well—knownfromprevious surveys; others have received
little notice.—24—
It is known, for example, but undermphasized, that almost all reci-
pients of TAA work in manufacturing industries. Hence, their peers are
most accurately. other manufacturing workers, not U.S. labor at large. It
is also well known that TAA recipients are more concentrated than their
peers in footwear and apparel, as Table 2 reveals. It is less well known
that the auto industry is the source of a much higher proportion of TAA
recipients than of their peers ——evenas eaxiy as 1976. These industry
differences between the TAA and UI samples can be argued to be
the sole source of differences between beneficiaries of TAA and others,
without any reference to international trade. But this observation begs
the question of what caused the industry differences ——towhich a sensible
answer is international trade.
Among the most important findings of this survey is that TAA recipients
were much more likely than UI recipients to experience temporary unemployment
or reduced hours, as revealed in Table 3. They were only barely more likely
than UI recipients to have worked for a company that closed down, and much
less likely to have changed their industry or occupation between separation
and the interview, roughly three years later. For TAA recipients, worker
experience differed significantly among those on permanent layoff, those on
temporary layoff, and those on reduced hours. Workers on temporarylayoff
made up the majority of the TAA caseload. Since most previous commentary on
TAA has focused on permanently displaced workers, it is useful here to
describe the connection between temporary worker displacements,international
trade, and the TAA program.—25—
TABLE3
PERCENTAGE DISTRLBUTION OF
SURVEL'ED TAAAND UIRECIPIENTS (1,976):






1 ——reduced—hours 16.6 3.3
ADJUSTMENT:
Company closed down 16.0 15.2
Changed industry 15.6 31.2
——permanentlydisplaced 67.5 68.0
Changed occupation 25.1 39.1
——permanentlydisplaced 54.0 60.8
1The average reduction was from 41 hours per week to 23 hours per
week, and the average spell of reduced—hours employment lasted
56 weeks.
Source: Corson et al. (197, pp. ni, 38 42, 68)—26—
Temporarily displaced workers have both unique advantages arid unique
problems when compared to the permanently displaced workers usually visu-
alized as being primary recipients of TAA. Relative to permanently displaced
workers, the duration of trade—related dislocations for those temporarily
displaced is likely to be short, and their income loss only moderate. But
ifsuch short spells of unemployment occur more frequently because of trade,
workers who are prone to temporary dIsplacement may still suffer dispropor-
tionatelyfromunpredictable and uncertainincome streams.22 Compensation
22Thjspossibility rests on the assumption that wages and other provi-
sions of contracts do not vary to offset the unpredictable and uncertain
income streams. If contract terms do take account of this uncertainty, then
there would seem to be no reason to believe that the uncertainty produces
suffering over the long run, and no case for compensation. See note 5 above.
This possibility notwithstanding, uncertainty is precisely the reason why
many policyniakers subscribe to the need to compensate nations (analogously
to workers) for volatile export earnings through the IMP's Compensatory Financ-
ing Facility and the EC's STA3EX. These are self—financing loan programs,
however, which raises the question of whether the TAAprogram shouldinclude
concessionary (but repayable) loans for certain purposes.
forsuch volatile incomes and job prospects might be art important justifica-
tion for paying temporarily displaced workers. No clear adjustment (efficiency)
motive exists for TAA in this case because it is not obvious that the workers
shouldleavethe industry on economic grounds.
But why should trade increase the volatility of worker incomes in import—
competing industries? There seem to be a number of reasons. First, in
industries such as steel, dumping is widespread and unpredictable, causing U.S.
business to sag notably some years (even quarters) and rebound itt others.
Second, speculative import purchases may take place when dollar depreciation
threatens, and then may beoffsetsubsequent to dollar depreciation byabnormally—27—
lowimport purchases. Domestic business can be correspondingly slack, then
prosperous,23 depending on product durability, substitution patterns, and
23The opposite phenomenon occurs when dollar appreciation is expected,
and then actually takes place.
buyer loyalty to competing varieties. Employment in domestic industries can
thus be correspondingly slack, then prosperous. The auto industry seems to
be a good candidate for sensitivity to exchange—rate related demand fluctua-
tions.Andspeculationbased on changesin orderly marketing agreements can
havesimilar effects.
But does TAn cause some temporary unemployment while alleviating its
burdens? An unanswered question is whether the liberal availability of TA.A
supplementsto standard unemployment insurance increases incentives that
encourageemployersto lay off workers temporarily (because such workers are
better acconuuodated), as discussed above. If so, any such additional workers
will be worse off because their TAA payments do not match their straight
salary. And there may be some cost to the economy as a whole if the temporary
nature of a worker's dislocation inhibits job search and if TAA keeps workers
affiliated with a declining industry when more productive positions are
available elsewhere.
Similar questions arise with respect to the availability of TAn for
workers placed on reduced hours by their employers. Presumably employers use
the option of reducing or increasing hours for the same reasons they use
temporary layoff S.Andfluctuations in hours may berelated to trade in the
same wayastemporarylayoffs. But once again, to the extent thatTAn availa-
bility forreduced hours encourages employer recourse to them, it increases—28—
the need for compensation while simultaneously satisfying it. TAAavaila-
bility may again undermine any adjustment goals of the program by indenturing
workers to a declining industry arid discouraging their job search. 'roman
efficiency perspective, it is clearly better to have half as many workers
full—time (with the remainder in other jobs) than the historical work force
all working half—time.
Some findings from the present survey confirm common beliefs about TAA
recipients,whether permanently, temporarily, or partially dislocated. Table
4 reveals that they are somewhat older, less educated, more stable in their
employment history, and more likely to be union members, female, minority
status, married, and the head of a household than the average unemployed
24
worker.
24l comparisons are to unemployed manufacturing, workers who receive UI
payments. Such comparisons must be treated with caution, however, because of
their one—dimensional nature. Pro—TAA commentary, for example, tempts one
to think of recipients as especially "deserving" because they are both older
and less educated. It is probably more accurate to think of them as less
educated because they are older. Similarly, age may explain marital status,
and both explain stability. Industry mix may explain minority status. Struc-
tural expansions of the regression analysis outlined in the next section of
the paper could in principle control for such internal causality.
But they are not likely to be poorer. Fewer fall below the poverty line.
And their pre—dislocation incomes (principally for men) exceed the incomes of
their peers, as do household incomes. This finding seems to preclude any
relative—income, "progressive"motivation for maintaining TAAbenefits that
aremore attractive than UI benefits.
Theconventional belief that trade—displaced workers face more difficult
short—run adjustment problems than a typicalunemployed worker does seemto






TAA RECIPIENTS UI RECIPIENTS
PERSONAL CHARACTERISTICS:
:1-




Percent that had vocational 2
ortechnical schooling 24.8 27.6
Percent female 38.5 35.5
Percentminority 20.9 19.7
Percent married2 79.0 68.1
Percent head of household2 94.5 87.7
PRE-SEPARATIONJOB/INCOME CHARACTERISTICS:
Mean years tenure 11.8 7.8
Percent quit or fired
(notlaid off) 1.1 6.8
Percentin union 81.3 65.8
Mean annual income of
recipient $11,080 $9,820
Mean annual income of spouse $2,690 $2,820
Percent of households with
income below poverty line 1.9 3.7
1at separation date
2at interview date
separation date, not including workers on reduced hours in the base
4inyear before separation, 1975 dollars
Source: Corson etal.(1979,pp. 17, 21, 28, 38)—30—
TABLE 5
DISTRIBUTIONOF SURVEYED





Meanweeks of first unemployment
spell after separation 21.9 21.9
——permanentlydisplaced 41.8 32.8
——temporarilydisplaced 17.4 16.3
Percent of weeks unemployed 18.4 20.9
——neverrecalled 28.0 25.4
——recalledat least once 15.6 18.0
Percent of weeks out of the
labor force 8.3 9.9
——neverrecalled 26.3 20.5
——recalledat least once 3.0 3.1
Percent of weeks employed 73.8 69.5
——neverrecalled 46.0 54.6
——recalledat least once 82.0 79.2
AT INTERVIEW:
Percent unemployed 7.2 11.6
Percent out of labor force 11.9 12.0
Percent employed 80.9 76.4
Ratio of mean weekly wages:





Source: Corson et al. (1979, pp. 48, 58, 59, 64 65, 69).—31—
The duration of their initial unemployment spell is longerthan for UI
recipients, and the incidence of recurrent separationsis slightly more
frequent. Those TM recipients never recalled totheir previous job
between separation and interview spend a larger proportion ofweeks
uiployed,arid are more likely to be out of the labor force than their
UI counterparts. The latter finding mayreflectretirement or discourage-
ment more than anything else, since TMrecipientswere relatively less
likely to receive training. There is, of course, a potentialcausality
problem in these findings. Comparatively generous TM benefits mayhave
encouraged workers to take longer to locate a new job and henceincreased
their measured unemployment spells at first. This could be true despite
the lumpiness and unpredictability of TM payments.
By the interview date, roughly three to threearid a halfyearsafter
initial layoff, most differences in the adjustment burdens of TM recipients
andtypicalunemployed workers disappeared. TMrecipientsare acutally less
likelyto be unemployed or out of the labor force (barely) thanothers. But
those who have not returned to their earlier jobs are likely tohave experi-
enced a significantly greater decline inincomethanthe average reemployed
worker(and even the temporarily displaced TM recipients suffer asmall
relative decline). They might have been presumed toloserents on accumu-
lated on—the—job skills thatare probably greater than those of the average
unemployedworker, since TMrecipients have alonger andmore stable work
history. They may alsohave lost some rents thatareunrelated to skill and
a function of their former industry's political pressurefor protection
against imports.
Some of these findings are surprising in light of previous surveysof—32--
TAArecipients(note 12 above). Part of the explanation can be found in
the rapidly shifting industrial incidence of injury from trade in the early
1970's. The relative importance of the footwear industry and the electronics
industry declined in successful TM petitions; the relative importance of
appare1 autos, and steel increased (apparel has since declined and footwear
has risen again, according to Table 2). This altered worker characteristics
among TM recipients because skill mix, ethnic concentration, job stability,
and average wages differ substantially from industry to industry. And it was
to be expected to the extent that cumulative and ongoing competitive pressures
(many from newly industrializing countries) reduce the industrial importance
of declining U.S. industries such as footwear and textiles by causing marginal
firms to fail.
The Sample as a Reflection of the Effects of Both Trade and AA
It would have been valuable to be able to measure separately the effects
of import competition on workers and the effects of the TM program itself
(see note 19 above). No continuous measure of the former was employed
besides the certainty that trade had been an "important" cause of dislocation,
as prescribed by the legislation embodying certificationrequirements.2
25The same problem exists for Jacobson (1979) and is discussed by him.
The technical counterpart to this staterrient is that the variable TAA (1 for
TM recipients, 0 for UI recipients), which underlies all the tabulations
and regressions in this paper measures the influence on workers of both
injury from trade and TM itself. Tabular information on TM recipientsand
regression coefficients, therefore, reflect the frequently offsettinginflu-
ences of injury and its policy relief.
It was impossible to know just how important trade alone had been in altering
wages and working conditions before and after TM receipt.The surveye
—33—
measured mixed effects of both tra4e and TAA onwages andworking conditions.
Since TAA inmany aspects isdesignedto offset the impact of trade on U.S.
workers,it seenis likely that the survey and the analysis below understate
boththe (presumably unfavorable) effects of import competition on some U.S.
workers and the (presumably favorable) effects of TM. They do, however,
probably reflect the net effect of both forces with considerably more
accuracy. One test of the success of TM in achievingits distributional
goals would be that these net effects are small.
Measuring the impact of trade alone on workers is a difficult task.
Yet it is done subjectively every day in administrative determinationof
certification. A valuable complement to surveys like the one summarized
would be research on the certification process itself. What economicand
other variables underlie decisions to approve or disapprove a TM petition?
Can one determine a set of variables and the weights attached tothem that
predict the yes/no decision on the petition with someaccuracy?26 If so,
See Baldwin (1976) for an attempt to do this with Congressional
voting patterns on commercial policy.
one could use those same variables and weights to measurethe severity of work-
ers' injury from trade. One might also be able to explore the budgetaryand
performance implications of changing the weightsattached to the criteria
underlying certification, as is implicitly proposedwhenever TM is legis—
latively reconsidered.—34—
III.TAA EEPIENCEUNDERThE TRADE ACT OF 1974: JOB AND INCOME
RECOVERY IN A REGRESSION APPROACH
One— andtwo—dimensional comparisons of TAAandUI recipients are
sometimesmisleading. Nany comparisonsin Section II are explainednotso
muchby TAA/UI differences in programs, labor markets, or. competitive
pressures as by TAA/TJI differences in age, experiences industry mix,etc.
Cross—sectional multiple regression provides a useful way to control for
less important sample differences among workers while focussing on those
that are most interesting.
Tables 6 and 7 provide examples of such regressions, each vector of
estimated coefficients being displayed in a column. The dependent variable
explained in Table 6 reflects tiedium—terni employment recoveryafter initial
separation ——itis the percentage of weeks employed in the three to three
27
and a half years between initial separation and interview. The dependent
27Because it is a percentage, the dependent variable is truncated
(limited). Ordinary—least--squares regressions such as those summarized
below may thus be inferior to those run toexplaina logit transformation
of the percentage of weeks worked.
variable explained in Table 7 reflects medium—term income recovery inthe
same period ——itis the log of the weekly wage (in 1975 dollars) of each
individual in their job at the interview date, given (as an independent
28,29,30
variable) their weekly wage (in 1975 dollars) before separation.
28The presence of past wages in the regression is what allows the
coefficients to be interpreted as "income recoverycoefficients." Each
can be taken to record the impact of the relevantvariable on the
individual's change in weekly wage between separation and interview, given








































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































(log of) pra—separation weekly wages from both sides of the regression
equation.
290ther dependent variables could be exairted itt the same fashion to
discern other differences in TM and UI experience, e.g., labor—force
participation, search behavior (measured, say, by the ntber of job
contacts), and adjustment to initial separation.
30Moreprecise descriptions of independent variables than providedin
Tables 6 and 7 are available from the author.
Employment and income recovery were selected for emphasisinthis
section because they are thought to be the most important ways in which
trade—displaced workers would suffer compared with others in the absence
of the TM program. The upper left entry in each table suggests
that even with the TM program, though, trade—displaced workers have less
favorable experience than others. A TM recipient who was identical to a
UI recipient in age, experience, industry, socioeconomic status, etc. —
andeven in the proportion of pre—separation income replaced by UI/TM
payments ——wouldnevertheless have worked 4.56 percent fewer weeks over
the three—year period, and be earning almost 1 percent (0.831) less per
week, than the otherwise comparable UI recipient.
The direction of these differences squares well with intuition,
although it is not clear what variables that are excluded from the
regression might account for it. But neither the direction nor quanti-
tative size of these differences squares with the one— and two—dimensional
comparisons of Table 5 ——ananomaly that reveals the advantage of a
regression—based approach that holds all other things comparable (ceteris
paribus). The left—hand regressions of Tables 6 and 7 suggest thatthe
comparative employment recovery of TM recipients was lessfavorable than
suggested by Table 5, and that t1ir comparative income recovery wasmuch
less unfavorable.—50—
Theleft—handregressionsof Tables 6 and 7 were run over a sub—sample
of both UT and TAArecipients31But such a regression forces the
31912 workers were excluded from the regression sub—Sample because of
missing or inconsistent data on some of the variables. Details are
available from the author.
responses of each group to control variables to have the samemagnitude.
One might hypothesizeto the contrary that trade—displaced workers have
quantitatively different responses because trade dislocation issomehow
differentfrom disloeatons for other reasons. For example, one could
argue thatTAA recipientsmightbemore responsive to advance notification
thanothersbecause of their firm!smoreprecarious market position. Or
TAArecipientsmight be lesssuccessful per dollar of income support
becausetheytypically have hadless experiencethan Others injobsearch.
Columns (2) and (3) of the tables permit suchdifferential responsiveness by
allowing regression coefficients to differ between a UI sample of workers
and a TAA sample, as do columns (4) and (5) for further sub—samples of
permanently displaced UI and TAArecipients.32 The results do not strongly
the152 UIrecipients in the sample underlying column (2), half
were working for the same employer at the interview as when they were
separated. Of the 437 TAA recipients in the sample underlying column (.3),
76 percent were only temporarily displaced in this fashion.
support the hypothesis of differential responsiveness. The complementary
hypothesis that the regression over the UI sample (column (.2)) isthe same
as that over theTAAsample(column (3))could be definitively rejected
onlyfor wage recovery.33Thehypothesis of identicalresponsiveness of—51—
33me calculated value of the relevant F statistic was2.22,versus
critical values of 1.46 for a 5% significance level and 1.70 for a 1%
significancelevel. In the employmentrecoveryregressions of Table 6,
the calculated F statistic was1.48.
permanently displaced UI recipients (column (4)) and TAArecipients
(column (5)) wasneverrejected.34 The appropriate conclusion seems to be
34mecalculatedvalues of the relevant F statistics for Tables 6
and 7 were 1.08 and 1.42, respectively, compared again to critical values
of 1.46 (5% significance) and 1.70 (1% significance). Note thatthejob
recovery regression run over the permanently displacedUI sample was not
itself significant at conventional levels.
thatalthoughtrade—displaced workers and others do differ in job. and
incomerecoveryas summarized above, this difference is due primarily to
unidentified variables. Their employment/income experience might otherwise be
largely determined by the same conventional list of variablesin a
quantitatively similar way.
No attempt was made to test more subtle hypotheses, specifically that
while responseswere comparable to most independent variables, thatthe
t groups of workers responded differently to one or more. Alongthese
lines,there is at least somesuggestionincolunms (2)—(5)ofTable 7
that wagerecovery among UI recipients,but not among TAArecipients,was
hurtby being married, female, Hispanic, unionized, oran employee of a
companythat closed.35 Among TAA recipients, by contrast, wagerecovery
these relationships appeal to intuition except thatbetween
marriageand wage recovery. The negative impact f unionism in the former
job is sensible if union members are paid more than others,other things
being comparable, since some union members will beforced to take
subsequentjobs that arenot unionized.—52—
seemed importantlyand positively determined by their willingness to move
geographically,whereas that of UI recipients was, not.
Mostpreviousresearch has focussed on workers w1 are permanently
displaced by trade, and the regressions corresponding to this focus are itt
the right—hand column of each table. Some of the more interesting findings
aresummarizedbelow.But caution in generalizing is strongly encouraged
giventhesmallsizeof the worker sample (107).
For permanently displaced TAArecipients
(1)Thelarger the proportion of pre—separation wages thatUIand TAA
benefits replaci, especially at the beginning of unemployment experience,
the larger the proportion of weeks ployed in the subsequent three or
three and a half years, and the stronger the income recovery path. The
latter finding is familiar; the former much less so. •Thile the former is
quantitatively tiny and questionablysignificant, it suggests a possibility
worthy offurther investigation. It is well established that generous
benefitslengthen first spells ofunenipioyment.36 Yetthey may also
36Harnmerinesh(1977) provides a summary.
therebyreduce the incidence and duration of subsequent spells by
increasing the "efficiency" of initial job search. The first jobtaken
afterseparation may more likely be a 'tgood match."
(2) Advance notification of an impending separation bad a smalland
positive influence on job and income recovery,but the coefficients are not
very significant by conventionalstandards.—53—
(3) TAArecipientsin apparel, footwear, and the auto industry bad
muchmore favorable employment experience than TAArecipientsin other
industries (from 7 to 17 weeks per year more work). It is hard to account
for this finding. Onemightsensibly have conjectured exactlythe
opposite, especially in apparel and footwear, since industryvariables in
the regressions might have been supposed to measuretheinter—industry
intensity of import competition on workers.Perhapsin. 1976 displaced
garmentand shoeworkers were sufficiently protected by orderly marketing
agreements at the product level that their job recovery wasfaster than
elsewhere despite the long decline of their industries.
(4) TM recipients in the auto industry had much morefavorable
income recovery than TM recipients in other industries (3.5 percentmore
growth in the weekly wage given what it used to be).
(5) Rather than being a liability, the combination of greater age
and labor-force experience was favorable to employment recovery.Compared
to an otherwise identical 40 year old TM recipientwith 20 years of labor
force participation, a 50 year old with 30 years of participationworked
weeks per year more between separation and interview, and a30 year old
with 10 years of participation worked 7 weeks per year less.
(6) The combination of greater age and labor—force experience was
favorableto income recovery only up to a critical level, representedby
persons in their inid—30's with 13 yearsof labor—force participation.
Compared to them, 50—year—old workers with 30 years participation.recovered
2 percent less of their prior income stream.
(7) Being black or Hispanic impeded job recovery,and being black or
disabled impededincome recovery.—54—
(8) Job recovery was inversely related to labor—market incomes of
other members of a household, and the quantitative response was
surprisingly large (more than twoweeksless work per year by the TAA
recipientfor every $100 of other family income).
(9) The incomes of those workers who expressed willingness to pull
up stakes and move to find suitable employment were 2.5 percent higher
than the incomes of those who were not willing, whether or not a move
actually took place.
It bears repeating thatthesenine conclusions are for permanently
displaced TAArecipientsonly, representing less than one quarter of the
TAAsample.Similar studies mightprofitablybecarriedout for
temporarilydisplaced TAA recipients, although intuition regarding their
experience is much less well developed. Finally, a great deal morework
needs to be done along these lines before any assessmentcanbe madeof
therobustness of the conclusions of this paper.Ri
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